Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind ( Explorations in Cognitive Science) [Jerry A. Fodor] on *FREE* shipping on. FODOR’S PSYCHOSEMANTICS Jerry Fodor. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy ofMind. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press,. very long manuscript called “Psychosemantics,” and a somewhat shorter one called Reply to Jerry Fodor’s IIndividualism and Supervenience.’ ” Paper.
I suspect foxor proponents of RV will be puzzled by your worry. Of course what we really care about, with respect to determinacy, is our own concepts. When we show movies of rabbit parts coming together, pulling apart, we see that two such nodes are activated when apart, one node when together, and this tracks the psychophysics, etc. So, let the visual system be an initial producer, then insert an intermediate consumer of the visual system that takes output from the visual system, then responds, then let John use the output of the intermediate consumer.
Was Psychosemantics a Failure?
This langauge I think was originally from Sejnowski. This seems like a perfectly sound naturalistic, selectionist account of how the detectors came to be. That strikes me as a problem for informational semantics. Thinking of them informationally helps explain their behavioral accuracy and orients our thinking about what features of the neuronal spike trains to look at as jfrry causally potent for downstream neurons e.
Nearly all of the behavior of the rat that seems intelligent has been shaped by operant conditioning. They were on the right track, but not quite there yet. Philosophical Review, 3: Tomatoes look just like tomatoes-or-Xgiven that the first disjunct is present. For the experimentalist, the big advantage has to do with designing experiments. If he disagrees with me about holism or CRS, then so be it.
I should have been clearer about that.
Thanks, and same to you, Pete! Dennett has made famous a description of the behavior of the Sphex wasp.
Philosophical Review, pages —99, I recently had a conversation with three self-identified Rutgers people two Rutgers faculty plus a senior philosopher who visited Rutgers in the early s who claimed that at Rutgers it is accepted wisdom that psychosemantics was a failure.
I wish I recall that vote. Hi, Tony, Now, in truth, unlike you.
Bogdan – – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 June: Doede – – Tradition and Discovery 20 2: Naturalistic theories of content are supposed to apply to all creatures, including humans. My retina functions as a phototransducer. The amazing precision possible in language may mislead us into looking for such precision in the mind. But like many psychologists and ethologists, she often assumes that there will be no surprises at the neuro level, after the psychology and ethology have been done, i.
I think both 1 and 3 are pschosemantics, but not sure if they are consistent. Of course, this is basically what Dretske already said in KFI digital v analog contents, conceptual complexity measures to differentiate coextensional contents, etc.
While informational states may be a necessary condition for representational states, as Eric Thompson in an earlier post claimed, there are important differences. Anyway, why think a frog or a hoverfly! But, psychlsemantics apparently double down and say they do. I think we do not see that.
Was Psychosemantics a Failure? – The Brains Blog
Incidentally, in our lab we do see very different sensory responses depending on the behavioral state of the rat. And we can say this because the most natural causal-explanatory account of the selection of this system mentions objects, not undetached object parts.
Note that this symmetry detection system is also piggybacking on top of a more general visual cortical system that effects correspondences to spatial layout, which explains how downstream systems pretty much the rest of the cortex have been able to enhance fitness. But I take your point—the worries have their standing with or without Fodor.