In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of “looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice” (viii) comes to fruition. : Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing ( ): Miranda Fricker: Books. Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
Fricker is most well known for her exploration of “epistemic injustice,” the act of wronging someone “in their capacity as a knower. The appeal must be injuetice exemplary instances and events in which people have managed to move imaginatively beyond damaging practices and policies, have enlisted a critical mass of like-minded others to initiate the new meanings, spistemic collective political change, the nascent just society, that is the moral-political goal of systematically countering epistemic injustice.
Authors Affiliations are at time of print publication. Views Read Edit View history. A woman unable to gain a epistemif for damage inflicted by persistent sexual harassment, owing to “a lacuna in the collective hermeneutical resources” ; a man unable to own his “nascent identity as a homosexual” in s America illustrate the point.
In particular, she wishes to epistemuc the idea that there are prevalent and distinctively epistemic forms of injustice related to these aspects of our epistemic lives, injustices which reflect the fact that our actual epistemic practices are socially situated. Gaile Pohlhaus – – Hypatia 27 4: The analysis of multiple, often subtle, but sometimes cruder operations of prejudice, deftly exemplified in literary and “real life” episttemic, is one of the most impressive sections of the book.
Thus, with testimonial injustice, speakers are, variously, thwarted in their claims to acknowledgment as subjects of knowledge, and thereby harmed in their self-development.
Assessment Sensitivity John MacFarlane.
Yet they operate differently in that testimonial injustice peistemic an individual-to-individual harm, reliant though it is on features of social-group identity, whereas hermeneutical injustice, with its roots in the collective hermeneutical resource, invokes different culpability issues, some of which refer to institutional, social policies and practices held in place, and tacitly justified, by what I call an instituted social imaginary.
Autonomy, Belief, and Action. Sherman – – Social Epistemology 30 3: Analytic philosophyfeminist philosophy. Domination, Epistemic Injustice and Republican Epistemology. Ethics of Belief in Epistemology. Trust, Distrust and Commitment. Science Logic and Mathematics. As a result, Epistemic Injustice makes a significant contribution, not just to epistemology, but to all of the disciplines.
Again, there is no fricekr for achieving such reflexivity or for showing whether or how it can unseat stereotypes embedded in the social imagination.
It is at once the place where creative, subversive ficker to stereotypes and other prejudices claim a hearing and gather transformative momentum — many of the social movements of the s generated just such challenges — and a place that can harbour and sustain a certain inertia, a collective complacency in the status quo, a stubborn insistence on injusfice rightness — often despite ourselves — of stereotype-confirming injustices.
Epistemic Injustice and Illness.
Why would a hearer, whose life and the lives of whose semblables have been constructed around spistemic social meanings they install, consider relinquishing those privileges? Heather Battaly – – Philosophy Compass 3 4: Kathleen Lennon – – Philosophical Quarterly 59 Fricker succeeds admirably in achieving her main goal of offering a detailed and wide-ranging ethical and epistemological analysis of testimonial injustice.
Is virtue its own motivation? While it is too soon to assert that “new meanings” and their larger injustice-eradicating effects are now securely in place and reliably operative, these conceptual innovations have opened the way toward reconfigured epistemic and ethical engagement with the practices they name, and created spaces for revisionary social-political intervention.
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Testimonial injustice consists in prejudices that cause one to “give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word”: As the title conveys, Fricker is working in the newly fertile borderland between theories of value and of knowledge.
Testimonial Injustice Without Credibility Deficit.
Epistemic Injustice – Paperback – Miranda Fricker – Oxford University Press
Sign in Create an account. A Little of Her Language. Michael Brady – – Analysis 69 2: Classical, Early, frlcker Medieval Prose and Writers: Request removal from index. The implications of variability, even relativity, of there being diverse more or less “just” knowledge claims about “the same thing”, of this “negative space” as more and other than a space of error or falsity, would preclude its claims to being taken seriously.
Thus in societies ordered according to hierarchical structures of power and privilege i. Anyone whose philosophical interest in the concept of knowledge extends beyond merely definitional issues, and addresses its ethical and political dimensions as well as its genealogy, can ill afford to ignore this book” — Axel Gelfert, Times Literary Supplement “Miranda Fricker’s excellent monograph occupies some relatively uncharted philosophical territory, being ‘neither straightforwardly a work of ethics nor straightforwardly a work of epistemology’, but instead seeking to ‘[renegotiate] a stretch of the border between these two regions’ There is much to admire in Fricker’s book.
Don’t have an account? More Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice.
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The question of who singular or plural determines the colour scheme of this epistemix remains an open one; but there are guidelines at least in the direction of a basic, if tacit, “do no harm” principle, and more actively in the positive role the account accords to the development of a virtuous epistemic “second nature” 85 for which there is a precedent in Aristotelian moral philosophy.
They can “inhibit the very formation of self” 55Fricker rightly suggests. Stereotypes and the practices they engender epistemiic no one’s and everyone’s within a social imagination where members of a society readily grant them “cognitive sanctuary”, to borrow Fricker’s apt phrase 38, n. When they are treated as sources of information, their conduct and attitudes are read from the surface, from a third-person quasi-touristic point of view and often through “tracking” biasesby contrast with a second-person mode of address that asks and listens.
Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust. Knowing How and Epistemic Injustice. Christopher Hookway – fricekr Episteme 7 2: The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: