ERC A THEORY OF EQUITY RECIPROCITY AND COMPETITION PDF
Downloadable (with restrictions)! We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and. ERC. A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition. Gary E Bolton. Smeal College of Business. Penn State University, USA. &. Axel Ockenfels. Faculty of. CiteSeerX – Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people.
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Axel Ockenfels Gary E.
More about this item JEL classification: Corrections All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern.
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Bolton, Gary E, Download full text from publisher File URL: Experimental Evidence ,” EconometricaEconometric Society, vol. If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here.
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
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The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets. When requesting a correction, please mention this item’s handle: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes. A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition.
CiteSeerX — ERC — A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition
You can help correct errors and omissions. See general information about how to correct rrciprocity in RePEc. The purchase of moral satisfaction ,” Journal of Environmental Economics and ManagementElsevier, vol. David K Levine, Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers. For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: