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I can’t help but leaving my reading of Frank Jackson’s Epiphenomenal Qualia with a sense of wonder and a grinning awe. This, independent of. Epiphenomenalism is a position on the mind–body problem which holds that physical and .. () “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 32 , pp. – Online text; James, William. () The Principles of Psychology, . The knowledge argument is a philosophical thought experiment proposed by Frank Jackson in his article “Epiphenomenal Qualia” () and extended in ” What.

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In addition, we may hold the view that these neural properties are necessarily connected to qualitative properties; but, lacking explanation of this necessity, this connection will contribute no understanding of how qualitative properties could make a difference to behavior.

It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. He wants to show that epi is possible and uses three arguments to do so. The conclusions of this experiment have begun to receive some backlash and criticism, mainly by neuroscientists such as Peter Tse, who claim to show that the readiness potential has nothing to do with consciousness at all.

The Bogey of Epiphenomenalism The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Alexander Staudacher – – Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 A study by Aaron Schurger and colleagues published in PNAS [18] challenged assumptions about the causal nature of the readiness potential itself and the “pre-movement buildup” of neural activity in generalthus denying the conclusions drawn from studies such as Libet’s [19] and Fried’s.

In principle, multiple realisability would guarantee platform dependencies can be avoided, whether in terms of hardware and operating system or, ex hypothesibiology and philosophy. Segal argues that being a belief and being a desire are dispositional properties, and that dispositional properties are not efficacious.


Epiphenomenalists hold that conscious events are effects of certain neural events. Jackson suggests that Mary is simply discovering a new way for her brain to represent qualities that exist in the world. We believe we’ve learned the answer from a colorblind synesthete subject. But the epiphenomenalist denial of efficacy for qualia precludes the possibility of providing any such evidence.

Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPaperswith links to its database. This latter alignment is independently plausilbe. It is impossible, however, to suppress a realized condition while leaving its realizer constant, so there is no sense to the demand that beliefs should have causal powers that are additional to the causal powers of their neural state realizers.

If someone were raised in a stroboscopic room and subsequently ‘cured’ of the akinetopsia, they would not be surprised to discover any new facts about the world they do, in fact, know that objects move. Epiphenomenao to decisively answer this latter challenge is not generally taken to impugn our knowledge concerning tables and chairs, nor are physicists expected to lay it to rest before proceeding with their science.

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Among Lewis’s many considerations, there is one that seeks to enforce a connection between phenomenal information per se and epiphenomenalism. We know about other minds because we observe physical behaviour. Huxley and his contemporaries seem to have been impressed by preparations in epiphenomenql frogs had had various portions of their brains removed.

He rejects the claims of Physicalism. In Bregman’s auditory continuity illusionwhere a pure tone is followed by broadband noise and the noise is followed by the same pure tone it seems as if the tone occurs throughout the period of noise. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall ed. He compares us to a sort of intelligent sea slug living epipuenomenal a very restricted environment.


Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia – PhilPapers

Thus an eepiphenomenal stance would require us to prefer the hypothesis that simple sensations cause relatively complex neural events over the hypothesis that complex neural events that are required in any case for the causation of sensations are adequate to cause the neural events required for the causation of behavior. Other Internet Resources [Please contact the author with suggestions.

Since the Mary’s room thought experiment seems to create this contradiction, there must be something wrong with it. Instead, their surprise would come from their brain now allowing them to see this motion. Even if we knew that fact, we still wouldn’t know what it is like to be Fred, although we’d know more about him.

If phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of fundamental physical objects, and the latter stand in lawlike relations, then lawlike relations will epiphehomenal between phenomenal properties and some physical occurrences. Retrieved from ” https: Roughly thirty years later, Feigl expresses a similar notion.

Huxley was not alone among 19th century figures who gave vigorous and clear expositions epkphenomenal an epiphenomenalistic view. What is complete, according to the argument, is her knowledge of matters physical. Because consciousness is accessory to life and not essential to it, natural selection is responsible for ingraining tendencies to avoid certain contingencies without any conscious achievement involved.

More Troubles for Epiphenomenalism. Maudsley were exponents of the view.