• No Comments

The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical. The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true. Institut Jean-Nicod. The author would like to thank Valeria Giardino for her commen- taries on this review. Herman Cappelen, Philosophy Without. Intuitions.

Author: Kaziktilar Vudodal
Country: Liberia
Language: English (Spanish)
Genre: Environment
Published (Last): 16 November 2015
Pages: 218
PDF File Size: 8.92 Mb
ePub File Size: 4.41 Mb
ISBN: 173-1-63671-340-6
Downloads: 4775
Price: Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader: Mazuzil

Fixing Language Herman Cappelen. A splash of cold water in the face of a lot of contemporary philosophy. Philosophy without Intuitions Oxford University Press, Presumably it’s a bad idea to home in on the target phenomenon — or try to home in on it — by means of an initial characterization or criterion that, say, is heavily theoretically loaded, that clearly misclassifies paradigm cases, or that fails to differentiate the phenomenon from anything phlosophy of interest.

But perhaps they presuppose some such conception?

Epistemology of Intuition in Epistemology. If the selected features are held to be constitutive of intuitions, it will be. Twin Earth and Intuitions: Open Preview See a Problem?

Expecting Moral Philosophers to Be Reliable. He makes strange assumptions about justification such as intuotions a justified claim cannot be puzzling or spark further investigation and blatantly misinterprets many of the cases – most egregiously in that he mixes up reasons that justify with reasons that explain why.

I still think that paradigms serve the purpose: Rini – – Synthese 2: The pace is fast, the style is witty, a wealth of interesting issues are raised in only pages. Jennifer Nado – – Philosophical Studies 3: That’s as it should be, since capplen only thing that’s obvious, at the outset, is that they don’t fall neatly into any of the familiar categories. He also searches through a representative sample of philosophical texts, for signs that intuitions — as understood on the corresponding version s of Centrality, stated in either English or “philosopher’s English” — are treated as evidence.


We — relevant meta-philosophers — need to somehow home in on the phenomenon to be explored, with enough precision to begin exploring it, but without prejudging any of the hard theoretical questions that our exploration aims to shed light on.

Philosoohy candidate role of this kind is at the heart of the ‘method of cases’ — roughly: This is why I hate analytic philosophy, as its formality leaves humanity hanging.

Herman Cappelen, Philosophy Without Intuitions – PhilPapers

View all 3 comments. Understood in this way, the view isn’t just compatible with, but presupposes, a version of Centrality of the kind I endorse. Joel Pust – – Routledge. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: Herman Cappelen University of Oslo. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: The book succeeds in its stated aim to show pjilosophy arguments put forward in favour of essential indexicality are often shallow, border on the rhetorical, and that the notion of “perspective” probably has little philosophical mileage Last, nothing turns on Centrality being stated in terms of intuitions — rather than, say, intuitive judgments or beliefs or even intuitive verdicts or contents.


If I find the murderer, that is an explanation why the body is on the ground because she killed himnot a justification of my original claim that a body is on the ground – that claim was never in doubt. It also, of course, depends on what those meanings are or are supposed to beand on what referents these meanings determine.


Corin Suta marked it as to-read Sep 04, Language Turned on Itself: Request removal from index. What I want to focus on, however, is that we’re not provided with a diagnostic for the first practice-referencing feature in particular — intuitions’ role in the method of cases. The idea is to create the impression that there are overwhelmingly many pieces of evidence, some strong, others more speculative, but all cappelne in the same direction: Nice beginning, disappointing end.

But his book may well trigger a more nuanced overall discussion of the thesis. Here as elsewhere, initial descriptions like that serve as open invitations to confusion, and to dialectical dead-ends.

Intuituons explores a number of available options here Ten philosophical thought experiments 9. Books by Herman Cappelen. And a quick glance at the overall shape of the views that get a hearing in part II suggests that they don’t exhaust the options. Assertion is available at Amazon.

Posted in : Sex