Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind ( Explorations in Cognitive Science) [Jerry A. Fodor] on *FREE* shipping on. FODOR’S PSYCHOSEMANTICS Jerry Fodor. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy ofMind. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press,. very long manuscript called “Psychosemantics,” and a somewhat shorter one called Reply to Jerry Fodor’s IIndividualism and Supervenience.’ ” Paper.
What if a tiny piece has been chipped off, or perhaps just a molecule? Saying they fail is not say that they having nothing of interest to teach us. This is not an original point.
Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind – PhilPapers
Have I misread the account or are the psychologists wrong or something psychoeemantics This rigid, inflexible behavior contrasts sharply with the behaviors of rats, who learn quickly and hence respond flexibly to obstacles and threats.
This langauge I think was originally from Sejnowski. In these papers, the necessary and sufficient conditions for individual recognition in philosophese: Maybe a workable natural notion of content does not need to solve the disjunction problem. Nor a Fodor student, Dretske student, Millikan student, or Searle student. I have heard this from people in Maryland and Cincinnati, as well. You have some great clever arguments and ideas, but are in such an empirically impoverished state that most of what you say will end up looking either antiquated or lucky.
The moral, I think, is that the determinate content of a state is, constituted by its relations not only to the environment though that may well be necessary, especially for perceptual states but also to other states and, in some all?
Was Psychosemantics a Failure?
I psychosmantics forward to giving the paper the thorough read it deserves. So, your objection to introspection is orthogonal to what I need. Perhaps we are just lazy or naive, but my hunch is that we are not. This happens to conform to what we see in simultanagnosia e. So I think it is time to start looking at different approaches to the network of questions surrounding belief and representation.
And we can say this because the most natural causal-explanatory account of the selection of this system mentions objects, not undetached object parts. If high symmetry is more fit simply because other sex likes it, and we have runaway sexual selection, that is different from being more fit for reasons independently of attractiveness to potential mates: Over time, we see that it only reliably carries the information that there is a single object in the world that it is interested in in tracking.
I take it something up-stream like inferential role does the disambiguating. About that, I psyhosemantics not sure of the weight one should give to the animal communication literature, when it comes to content attributions to animal mental states. The rat is an extremely smart animal. So, my sense was that the basic problem was out there.
What are the implications of these moves for this account? Whereas the growing consensus among teleo folks seems to be that you need to consider both sides. Whereas I would suggest that, insofar as psychosemahtics seems obvious, this is motivated more by an impetus towards theoretical simplicity or something, rather than introspection.
For the experimentalist, the big advantage has to do with designing experiments.
This is a good place to note pychosemantics seems to be a point of disagreement between us. But causal role semantics has even worse problems with this not to mention with error, reference etc.
Psychosemantics Quotes by Jerry A. Fodor
Also, it seems to me hard to explain rat behavior without supposing that rats wonder whether p. If we are talking about the function of some neuronal region, then the neuronal details will tend to matter more. I doubt that rats are more like wasps than like psychosemantivs.
Sure, at some level this increases fitness. However, I have a concern about the lack of clear implications for psycho semantics of a theory of rat intentionality. Anyone cares to chime in? But, my understanding of the bit of the scientific literature I have seen on this is that the scientists psychosemanticw it that humans track and represent facial symmetry as proxy for reproductive fitness. Once these are acquired in an informational mileau, they can be combined into new complex concepts e.
One could be that a teleosemantic theory assigns only generic content, like fitness or nutritious. They were on the right track, but not quite there yet.
Eating red roundish things increases fitness since eating the red roundish things is nomologically correlated with being an apple, a fruit, and nutritious.
And because there are so many free parameters it seems a bad case to push so hard. One might think that there are some who insist that accounts of representation must do certain explanatory work, and are pessimistic, and others that think that more modest and worthwhile explanatory goals are within reach. Garfield – – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 1: I offer a naturalistic and externalist account of empty concepts that shows how they can be shared across individuals.
Let me just pick one for the moment. A final somewhat unrelated concern that philosophers specifically should probably worry about: